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PREFACE 
New Zea1ana is a country with a 10ng coast 1ine and a 1arge 
fisheries resource. Over recent years, this ~esource has become more 
significant both in terms of va1ue and the visabi1ity of the c1aims 
upon the resource by the Maori peop1e. The a110cation of the property 
rights inv01vea witn the fisheries resource has recent1y been receiving 
attention and the 1~~3 Fisheries Act proviaes for an integrated 
management approach and a ba1ancing of the needs of aifferent use 
groups. 
lhis paper examines the question of the Maori c1aim to the 
fisheries resource ana the economic efficiency aspects of meeting those 
c1aims. lhe mechanisms proposea are app1icab1e to a wide range of 
resource a11ocation questions and. as the author points out, cou1a be 
used without impairing the economic efficiency of resource use. 
( iii) 
R G Lattimore 
Director 

SUMMARY 
The present call for recognition of maori fishing rights is 
based on the Treaty of Waitangi. Similarities between the Maori rights 
and recent aevelopments with North American Indian fishing rights are 
presentea ana aiscussed. Traditional Maori fishing ana cultural values 
are aiscussed ana a current Maori position outlinea. 
Economic efficiency issues are examined, and the conclusion is 
reachea that a Change to more Maori ownership of fishing rights is 
unlikely to compromise economic efficiency. Issues arise in trying to 
value different cultural beliefs between two groups in society, but 
these aifferences can be accommodated within an economic model. The 
maJor issue is an equity concern, ana the deDate should concentrate on 
equity ana the legal and moral ramifications of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
(v) 

Section 1 
Maori Fishing Rights 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a growing concern in New Zealand about the 
issues associated with traditional fishing rights. The 
legal and moral claim for Maori ownership of the New Zealand 
fishing resource is based upon the Treaty of Waitangi. This 
treaty was signed between many of the Maori Chiefs of New 
Zealand and the English Crown on 6th February, 1840. The 
English version of Article 2, the part relevant to 
fisheries, reads, in the first part: 
"Her Majesty, the Queen of England, confirms and 
guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand, and to 
the respective families and individuals thereof, the full, 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and 
Estates, Forests, Fisheries, and other properties which they 
may collectively or individually possess, so long as it is 
their wish and desire to retain the same in their 
possession." (Pearce 1968). 
Although this treaty has never been ratified and 
passed into law, it has come to be a most important symbol 
to all New Zealanders. The issue is that many New 
Zealanders, including most of the Maoris, feel the rights 
guaranteed under the treaty have not been honoured. This is 
exemplified by the following two quotes: 
"There is a view that Maori fishing interests can be 
protected as part of the general public interest in fishing. 
This view reflects a refusal to take Maori values seriously 
or to come to grips with the promise our forefathers made in 
the Treaty of Waitangi. We must now face Maori demands for 
the exclusive use of traditional fisheries in accordance 
with a literal interpretation of the Treaty." (Findings of 
the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manakau Claim 1985), and: 
"We conclude unanimously that the law pertaining to 
Maori fishing grounds does not give proper recognition to 
Maori interests in the light of the Treaty of Waitangi" 
(Interdepartmental Committee on Maori Fishing Rights 1985). 
A similar situation 
issues unresolved between 
has arisen 
traditional 
resource 
Canadian 
Rights: 
use. Pearse in a major 
with Fisheries, concluded, 
in Canada, with many 
fisheries and current 
policy statement on 
respect to Indian 
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" ... apart from the law Canadians have a moral 
responsibility to ensure that this important claim on fish 
resource is respected. It is inconceiveable to me that 
those Indians who entered into treaties more than a century 
ago would understand or could have anticipated, the 
subtleties of the parliamentary and judicial system that 
could override their bargain with the government ft (Pearse 
1982). 
In the United States the Boltd decision of 1974 
reaffirmed the Treaty-Indians of Washington States' right to 
one half of the salmon resource and also the guarantee of 
preservation of that resource (Blumm and Johnson 1981). In 
many respects the Indians of the Pacific Northwest and the 
New Zealand Maori have parallel cases. Both regarded 
fishing as the economic and cultural centre around which 
their life-style evolved. In both the Stevens' Treaties of 
Washington and the Waitangi Treaty, the tribes were prepared 
to sell land only if they were guaranteed the right to fish. 
Both were negotiated by Government diplomats with tribal 
representatives unfamiliar with legal expression and not 
represented by lawyers. The Stevens' Treaties have been 
ratified by law, the Waitangi Treaty has not been. 
The objective of this paper is to review Maori fishing 
rights from an historical perspective and discuss the 
current position of these for the Maori. The efficiency and 
equity implications of possible changes in ownership of the 
fishing resource are discussed. Some parallels and 
differences between the New Zealand and North American 
Native fishing rights issues will be outlined. 
1.2 Traditional Maori Fishing 
In a predominantly coastal society where no land 
mammals were available for meat, the Maori society placed 
great reliance upon the fishery resource. It was more 
however than just a source of food. In a spiritual sense 
the oceans were of great significance. They were under the 
domain of a deity (Tangaroa) and the ftproducts" were his 
children. A complex set of rituals governed the 
relationships between fisherman and the produce of the sea. 
These rituals included a set of ethics which provided the 
additional benefits of conservation through prohibition 
(rahui) of harvesting at certain times of the year. This 
combination of respect and reverence for the sea and its 
products endures today and underlies much of the concern for 
fisheries expressed by the Maori. Firth writes that in 
spite of popular belief about common property, the Maori had 
a well-defined property rights system with regard to both 
land and fishing grounds. Each hapu (extended family) owned 
a fishing area with carefully defined boundaries, and these 
were handed down from one generation to the next. 
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The Maori had a seasonal pattern of labour 
organisation for each occupation. Fishing was divided by 
season, with geographical and climatic differences 
explaining much of the apparent variation in these fishing 
seasons. There can be little doubt that the Maori were 
excellent fishermen with a reasonably sophisticated 
technology. Seine nets were sometimes very large, possibly 
up to 5 fathoms deep and 400 to 500 fathoms in length. 
Barbed hooks, rolled 2-ply flax lines and traps were all 
used extensively. The combination of a plentiful resource 
and skilled fishermen ensured the Maori of a good catch. 
More importantly , they knew when and where to fish: "No 
Maori threw a baited hook into the sea or set a trap on 
chance but he knew definitely the kinds of fish he was after 
and the time and place where he would meet with success" (Te 
Rangi Hiroa(Sir Peter Buck)1949). 
Harvesting of seafood (kaimoana) also held great 
cultural importance for the Maori. Much mana (prestige) and 
standing was associated with being able to provide feasts at 
meetings and cultural events, and it was important that 
supply of food should exceed the needs of guests. A catch 
was often shared, sometimes to the extent that there may be 
none left for the original catcher of the seafood. Tribes 
were renowned for a particular species of seafood, and it 
was considered important to invite guests to share in this 
particular food. This tradition is still part of modern day 
Maori culture, and the desire to harvest kaimoana for 
special occasions is behind much of the present concern for 
rights to the fishery resource. 
1.3 Current Situation 
An historic national hui (meeting) to consider Maori 
fishing rights was held in November 1985. All the Maori 
tribes of New Zealand were represented, and this hui was the 
first occasion in New Zealand's history where this has 
happened. Following this hui, a submission has been made to 
the Parliamentary Select Committee on Fishing. A Maori 
position has been made quite clear with this submission, 
with the Maori Council stating that the Treaty of Waitangi 
maintains ownership of fisheries to be the sole domain of 
the Maori, and any impact which results in financial 
gain/return must be negotiated between the Government and 
the Maori. The principle of joint ownership as enacted in 
the Lake Taupo case (discussed later) is adopted in the 
management plan, and one half of all royalties from fishing 
shall belong to the Maori. Whether or not this position 
will be agreed to is likely to become an important issue in 
New Zealand politics. An opposing view, expressed later by 
commerical fishermen, considers "it is not too suprising 
that a national group (newly formed) should "shoot for the 
moon", when in real terms they will be lucky to make it 
around the block in the near future" (Maori Fishing Hui 
1986). 
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The major precedent for ownership and administration 
of fisheries is Lake Taupo, New Zealand's largest lake and 
an internationally renowned trout fishing resource. Under 
the terms of a 1926 Act, "The bed of the lake known as 
Taupo, ... , together with the right to use the respective 
waters, are hereby declared to be the property of the Crown, 
freed and discharged from the (Maori) customary title (if 
any) or any other [Maori} freehold title thereto." A 
special Trust Board was established to pay the Tuwharetoa 
Maori Tribe one half of all licences, camp fees and fines 
and penalties associated with this resource. These have 
been in the order of $200,000 annually in recent times. 
Also, up to 50 licences are to be made available to members 
of the Tuwharetoa Tribe free of charge. 
Should the Maori view as exemplified by the Lake Taupo 
example be adopted, what are the implications? Firstly, the 
Maori claim is for all fish resources in New Zealand, 
including species such as orange roughy which have only been 
harvested from New Zealand's deep water in the last few 
years. It is generally recognised that the Maori claim to 
"shellfish" resources such as paua, kina and cockles may be 
legitimate, but present claims are much wider than this. 
Section 2 
Econoaic Efficiency 
Most analysts are familar with the so-called common 
property problem of open access dissapating any economic 
rent from a resource and the subsequent biological 
overfishing. New Zealand is addressing this overfishing 
problem in three different management areas. Firstly, the 
deep water resource is operated by Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQ's). This was relatively easy to introduce, as 
the resource has only been developed by New Zealand 
interests in the last 10 years and a few large scale 
operators reduce transaction costs. Secondly, most 
shellfish and crustaceans are allocated by a system of 
licences and quotas. Many of these resources have been 
overfished in the past but now are controlled. Finally, 
major problems exist in the inshore fin fishery and ITQ's 
are being introduced to alleviate these problems (Sandrey 
and O'Donnell 1985). 
Theoretically, ITQ's provide an excellent solution to 
problems of commercial overfishing. Property rights pass 
from a public to a private solution. Transferability 
ensures economic efficiency as rights move to those with the 
highest willingness to pay for them. Limitations of ITQ's 
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include transaction costs, which involve both enforcement 
and intervention costs, and in the equity issues associated 
with the initial allocation. Once the initial allocation 
has been made, economic rents should accrue to the owners of 
the fisheries resource. How the owners of the resource are 
defined is purely an equity issue and does not alter the 
efficiency of ITQ's. 
Problems exist in the allocation of fish stocks 
between recreational and commercial fishers. As discussed, 
commercial fishery allocations can be accommodated by the 
ITQ's. With recreational fishing the vaulation techniques 
are more complex. The value of fish caught is only one 
aspect of benefit. Total value of the experience, measured 
as consumer surplus or willingness to pay, is the relevant 
economic benefit. Both aspects of the same fishery can be 
optimally allocated by "public management for maximum net 
social benefits" and optimality is where marginal social 
cost equals demand in each fishery (Copes and Knetsch 1979). 
Price rationing by licence and quota in the recreational 
fishery and ITQ's in the commercial fishery would, in 
theory, optimally allocate the resource between these two 
potentially competing users. The marginal fish should be 
worth the same in each usage. Willingness to pay can be 
monitored in both areas to ensure optimal allocation. 
However, with traditional fisheries a third user group 
becomes a beneficiary of the resources. This is recognised 
in New Zealand with the 1983 Fisheries Act. The Act 
provides for a more integrated approach to the management of 
the resource through management plans and for balancing the 
needs of different user groups. These user groups are 
considered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(MAF) to include "recreational, commercial and traditional 
users" (MAF undated). Traditional users of the fishery 
resource have explicitly been written into New Zealand law, 
but no definition, or even mention of "traditional fishing" 
is given in the 1983 Act. In the National Goal for 
Fisheries Management the aim is "To ensure that the fishery 
resources of New Zealand are conserved and managed for the 
maximum benefit of the nation" (MAF undated). It is 
proposed to develop a separate policy on Maori fisheries, 
with the goal "To respect the cultural value of fishery 
resources to the Maori people and provide for traditional 
Maori fishing" (Cooper 1986). 
The problem facing managers in New Zealand is to 
incorporate this third dimension of "traditional" fishing 
into an operational plan. Legal interpretation of the 
Treaty of Waitangi will obviously be important. Ranking the 
goals is a political issue, but any change in objective's 
will have distributional effects. The issue for economists' 
to consider is how possible changes of ownership may impinge 
upon efficiency and to look at consequences of the 
distributional effects. 
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There are at least two possible outcomes of the Maori 
ownership issue. These are complete ownership of the 
resource at one extreme and a recognition of certain rights 
to harvest kaimoana in selected areas at the other. 
Obviously, some intermediate position is a possible outcome, 
but I shall examine the efficiency issues associated with 
each of these two situations. 
Complete ownership of the resource can be accommodated 
within the framework of ITQ's and quota and licence fees. 
This is the situation currently existing between the 
Government and the Tuwharetoa Tribe on Lake Taupo. Rights 
to the resource were declared to be property of the Crown in 
exchange for one half of fees over and above an 
administrative allowance. This issue is purely one of 
distribution of economic rents. Economic efficiency is in 
no way compromised. Transaction costs would be minimal. 
Although the Maori view of "traditional" fishing as 
applied to special rights to harvest kaimoana is not 
considered to be recreational fishing, allocation of some 
special rights could be made within a framework of 
recreational fishing. One group in society, by virtue of a 
different set of values, may have a different perspective of 
allocative efficiency. Even if the concept of placing 
monetary values on kaimoana is abhorrent to Maoris, the two 
groups have, in effect, a different willingness to pay. 
This would be reflected in demand curve analysis and optimal 
societal allocation made using marginality conditions. 
Economic efficiency is again not compromised. A cautionary 
note must be sounded about transaction costs. Both 
allocation and enforcement of special rights may not be 
costless and the setting up of special areas may become a 
protracted issue. Even if areas and rights are agreed upon, 
rigidities in the system may make it difficult to fine tune 
allocations in the future. 
Some interesting efficiency issues arise should any 
intermediate position result. For example, in the case of 
complete ownership the Maori people may want to maintain an 
operational interest in allocation of fishing rights. As 
discussed earlier, the Maori view may place a higher value 
on resource preservation. This would imply both a lower 
discount rate and a higher existence value placed on 
individual species. Both of these conditions would lead to 
a lower harvest rate, especially in the short term as stocks 
increased. The optimal time path for resource allocation in 
a society where two distinct sets of values exist becomes 
complicated. Usually different time preferences in society 
are considered to be a continuum among individuals and not a 
discrete change between cultures. In this case the 
ownership of rights becomes an efficiency issue. Pacific 
salmon provides an example where rights to harvest and 
enforced preservation of stocks are mandated under the Boltd 
decision. 
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A comparison with the Pacific salmon raises the issue 
of the relationships between ownership and control of the 
resources. There are at least two ways in which a one half 
ownership could be accommodated within the ITQ or licence 
framework. One approach would be, following the Tuwharetoa 
case, for MAF to administer the resource and redistribute 
rents. Another approach would be to allocate the Maori one 
half of all licences and ITQ's. This one half could then be 
transferable on the open market, with possible restrictions 
on transferability between Maori and non-Maori fishers. 
Leasing, but not ownership of rights by non-Maori's of the 
Maori allocation would ensure efficiency is not compromised 
but one half Maori ownership and control is ensured. The 
question then becomes one of deciding upon how transferable 
the T in ITQ's is! 
The conclusion must be that in most cases any possible 
changes in ownership of the fisheries is not an efficiency 
issue. Some special cases, exemplified by transaction 
costs, discount rate or preservation differences, do exist 
where efficiency becomes an issue but the major implication 
is one of equity. To whom should economic rents accruing to 
fisheries be distributed? Answers to these questions are 
political and not strictly economic issues. Distribution of 
rent is a transfer payment. 
Section 3 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Should the complete Maori ownership position prevail 
with one half of fees and royalties being redistributed, 
what are the equity implications? Rents from the deepwater 
ITQ's and royalties are expected to be in the order of $30 
million for the 1986 year. Inshore resources are being 
moved to ITQ's, but before this can happen the Government is 
facing negative rents (costs) in the form of an estimated 
$26 million buy-back scheme. Licence fees from shellfish 
and crustaceans are not significant. Redistributing one 
half of current rents of $15 million from the deepwater 
resource, the major rent producing area, would amount to 
around $50 annually for each Maori. 
Rents are now accruing to 
administrators of the resource. 
revolves around whether either of 
more legitimate claim to rents than 
fishers or to MAF as 
The distributional issue 
these two groups has a 
do the Maoris. 
Adopting an intermediate position and allocating 
special areas for kaimoana harvest appears to be accepted by 
New Zealanders, including commercial fishers "it is 
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realistic to expect that where a fishery has cultural 
significance then access will be guaranteed for cultural 
reasons" (Maori Fishing Hui 1986). This view is reinforced 
by the MAF view on traditional fishing (Cooper 1986). 
These changes can be incorporated into management plans. 
Equity considerations are less than those which will arise 
from an initial allocation of inshore ITQ's. 
There is little doubt Maoris are a less privileged 
group in New Zealand society. The 1981 Census showed median 
adult Maori male income to be $9,936 compared with $11,975 
for non-Maoris. This partly reflects a younger age 
structure, but is also a result of lower educational 
attainment, different employment patterns and a much higher 
unemployment rate amongst Maoris (New Zealand Year Book 
1985). It is considered to be a legitimate role of 
government to make income transfer payments to less 
privileged members of society. Transfer payments to Maoris 
for fishery rights, are as discussed, a political issue, but 
these transfers may be socially desirable in view of the 
economic indicators above. Fifty dollars per head will not 
go very far towards equalising incomes, but the explicit 
recognition of a Treaty right would be of considerable 
social and political significance. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
the Indian treaties must be interpreted as they would have 
been understood by Indians at the time (Blumm and Johnson 
1981). This same consideration is being asked by the Maori 
in New Zealand "They want their own experiences, 
traditions and values to occupy an honourable place in our 
society" (Finding of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manakau 
Claim 1985). 
A precedent for Maori ownership has been set by the 
Tuwharetoa Tribe declaring the Lake Taupo fishery to be the 
property of the Crown in exchange for one half of the fees 
and some special licence privileges. Should this precedent 
be followed in the future the efficiency distortions are 
unlikely to be large. Where ITQ's are in place, the 
relevant issues are the setting of quotas and distribution 
of rents. Efficiency may be involved in the first, the 
second is an equity consideration only. The major 
efficiency issue which is likely to occur is a possible 
lower harvest rate, reflecting a different discount rate and 
higher preservation value. This preservation has been 
legislated in North America following the Boltd decision 
(Wilkinson and Connor 1983). Where special kaimoana rights 
are legislated for the Maori for cultural reasons, this can 
be justified on an efficiency basis if the "psychic" revenue 
is included in the calculations. There is a need for the 
economist to evaluate cultural heritage and cultural 
maintenance as a negotiable factor in relations between 
indigenous people and the ruling sovereign. Property rights 
may be conferred because of economic determinants, but it is 
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essential to recognise that such determinants have a 
cultural base. It is not only the "psychic" revenue that 
needs recognition, but also spiritual and physical beliefs. 
Resources can be allocated between commercial, recreational 
and traditional users following marginality conditions and 
incorporating these concepts. 
~ecognition of Indian rights after long years of 
neglect came following a major court decision. Recognition 
of the Maori rights is inextricably tied up with the legal 
and moral issues of the Treaty of Waitangi. Discussion of 
these issues is outside the domain of an economist. My 
conclusion is that efficiency is unlikely to be compromised 
and the debate should concentrate on the equity 
considerations. 
The treaty of Waitangi specified "Lands and Estates, 
Forests, Fisheries, and other properties". Given the major 
problem of open access to fisheries resulting from a lack of 
clearly defined property rights, it should be no surprise 
that fisheries have become the focal issue in attempts to 
seek recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Tena Koutou Katoa 
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